Category Archives: Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act

Public Storage Sucks Has a New Twitter Account!

We are proud to announce our new Twitter account!  Now folks all across the USA and the world can instantly Tweet how much they hate Public Storage!

You can find us on Twitter here:

https://twitter.com/PubStorgeSucks

Or Tweet to us  at  @PubStorgeSucks  !

The photos on our Twitter account’s header show the Public Storage facility in Morton Grove, Illinois.  The nighttime shot shows the non-existent “security lighting” featured at this dump, with a car driving through the broken “security gate” left open for weeks at a time when it breaks – at least 3 times a year!

Here are some more shots of this same scene:

"Security Lighting" at the Public Storage in Morton Grove, Illinois on 25 April 2014.  These lights have been allowed to burn out over the last several years and none of them was ever replaced.

“Security Lighting” at the Public Storage in Morton Grove, Illinois on 25 April 2014. These lights have been allowed to burn out over the last several years and none of them was ever replaced.

This is our Twitter "header" photo, taken at Public Storage in Morton Grove, IL on 25 April 2014.  The headlights in the image are of a car driving through the broken, open "security gate" to the facility.

This is our Twitter “header” photo, taken at Public Storage in Morton Grove, IL on 25 April 2014. The headlights in the image are of a car driving through the broken, open “security gate” to the facility.

The smaller photo shows how the employees at Public Storage in Morton Grove shoveled the entrances to the storage lockers last winter.  This particular entrance was left like this for WEEKS!  People had to walk sideways to get to the door – carrying items in and out was impossible.

"Snow removal" at the Public Storage facility in Morton Grove, IL.  Photo taken on 11 February 2014. This building is one of the indoor unheated locker spaces.  This entrance was left like this for weeks.

“Snow removal” at the Public Storage facility in Morton Grove, IL. Photo taken on 11 February 2014. This building is one of the indoor unheated locker spaces. This entrance was left like this for weeks.

The "security gate" to the exit at Public Storage in Morton Grove, IL on 18 February 2014.  Their "snow removal" contractor plowed the gate OPEN and left it like this for WEEKS!

The “security gate” to the exit at Public Storage in Morton Grove, IL on 18 February 2014. Their “snow removal” contractor plowed the gate OPEN and left it like this for WEEKS!

More reasons why we say: PUBLIC STORAGE SUCKS!

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[UPDATED!] Public Storage Deceptive Business Practices: Not Notifying Customers of Date of Impending Auctions

[UPDATED 30 April 2014 (see below)]

We’ve been following the slow progress of one of our correspondents’ attempts to keep their personal belongings from being legally stolen by Public Storage in Morton Grove, IL.   This person reports to us this week that although the managers at Public Storage have related in phone conversations that the auction is scheduled for the 23rd of April, no written notice of this auction has been received, and though Public Storage has sent him several emails warning that an auction “is scheduled” not one of these emails has stated the exact date for that auction.  In addition, when this long-term customer of the company goes to their website to see what is owed on the storage unit, the website mentions nothing at all about a pending auction nor does it give the scheduled date of that auction.  These are screenshots of the Public Storage website showing this customer logged in to their account information:

 

How PS tricks people into thinking they have time to pay their bills when they don't.

Two days before scheduled auction of customer’s belongings, the customer’s Public Storage account page gives only vague warning of impending doom.

This is clearly a very deceptive move by Public Storage – they make it look like it’s “business as usual” as far as the customer can tell.  There are no big warning notices that an auction has already been scheduled – and is due to take place in 48 hours if FULL PAYMENT isn’t made!  And this document shows how long this “loyal” customer has been renting this space from Public Storage – since January of 2009!  Thus, in spite of the fact that this customer has been a long-time customer and has paid the bill every month for over 5 years – a grand total of at least $12,000.00 – Public Storage REFUSES TO ALLOW THIS CUSTOMER TO MAKE PAYMENTS on an arrears of just $780.75 and is set to legally steal this customer’s belongings and sell them at an auction as if they were abandoned property!  This is highway robbery!  And they refuse to work out a way for this customer to keep their property!  “Storage Wars”?  It should be “Storage Pirates”!

We’ll keep you posted if we receive any news on this case in the next 2 days.

This is why we say: “PUBLIC STORAGE SUCKS!”

UPDATE:  Our correspondent reports that they were able to come up with the money to pay off the prates at Public Storage the day before the scheduled auction on April 23, 2014; however, there was a strange wrinkle to the end of the story.

When this person went in to pay the bill and inquired about the scheduled auction date, the Public Storage employee on duty stated that the auction had been postponed for a month – until late May.  This customer had not been notified by mail, email or any other method of communication from Public Storage to this effect.  The customer asked for a copy of the document stating that the auction had been rescheduled; the PS employee replied: “I can’t print this out for you, the computer won’t allow it”.  Unable to verify that the auction had, in fact, been postponed a month, the customer elected to pay the amount past due, settling the case.  All of the property that Public Storage had essentially confiscated from this customer for the past two months was found intact as it had been left by the customer, in his storage unit.

The customer told us that the reason that he did not believe the PS employee when he told the customer that the auction was rescheduled was because “you simply can not trust these people to tell you the truth”.  The experience this customer went through with the managers of the Public Storage facility in Morton Grove, IL was of such an acrimonious nature that this customer no longer believes a word they say.  “What if I was to wait, assuming that there had been a new auction date set and just took the employees’ word for it?  How do I know that it wasn’t just a trick to get me to not pay the rent on time, and then Public Storage would just go ahead and auction off my stuff anyway?”

It’s a very valid point; and in fact we have received another communication from another source in Morton Grove who told us that he overheard a woman telling someone on the phone that she had just been swindled out of her prized family memorabilia by an unnamed storage company in Morton Grove that misled her about the scheduled auction date for her property.  They told her that she had several weeks before an auction would be scheduled; then when she had raised enough money to pay for her rent, and went to pay the bill in person, she was informed that the storage company had “moved up the date” of the auction and had, in fact, sold her property.  In this case, we have been unable to confirm that she had been victimized by Public Storage; but we relay it to our readers in order to warn you that these self-storage companies are turning into a bunch of wolves who are out to legally STEAL YOUR STUFF!

Public Storage Sucks!

 

UPDATE: Public Storage says “We Stopped Allowing Customers to Make Payment Arrangements Back in 2010”

Our correspondent in Morton Grove, IL – a five-year tenant at Public Storage in Morton Grove whose property has been stolen by Public Storage and is slated for auction on April 23 – has informed us that he received an email from a factotum at Public Storage named “Paulo C.”, who says that  “I would like to inform [sic] that as of December 2010, Public Storage is no longer issuing payment arrangements.”

So, sometime back in late 2010, the corporate vultures at Public Storage decided that they would do away with the “old skool” method of dealing with customers in a polite and decent manner and would begin to immediately set about legally stealing people’s family heirlooms and valuable property if those customers fell behind on their rent payments!  “No payment arrangements!  Stand and Deliver, or we’ll steal your stuff!  We’re Public Storage!  Pay up or we’ll steal your stuff!”  Public Storage abandoned the time-honored and universally expected custom of allowing customers to make arrangements to pay off their rent arrears BEFORE initiating lien proceedings.  No more.  With self-storage space at a premium, and with the storage companies’ Washington lobbying efforts bearing fruit year after year in the form of more pro-company legislation, these predatory storage companies are now taking advantage of the laws (that they have written in many cases) to steal their customers’ property!  There really is no other way to look at it!

What a way to run a business!

And get this: the factotum says that Public Storage “appreciates” their long-term customers!

Here is the full text of the missive from the Public Storage hireling:

************************

Customer Service onyx@publicstorage.com
to me, pcacciatore
Dear Mr. [xxxxxxxx],
Thank you for contacting Public Storage Customer Service. I would like to inform that as of December 2010, Public Storage is no longer issuing payment arrangements. To avoid auction, a full payment must be received before the auction date. Not only will a full payment remove your items from auction, but it will also grant you full access to your unit. For further information on the exact date and time of the auction, you may contact your local Property Manager. We do appreciate your business and your continued tenure.

Thank You

Paulo C. – Customer Service Support
1-800-567-0759

*************************

“We do appreciate your business and your continued tenure”!  What a joke!

Only in the United States could a company get away with something like this.  Anywhere else in the world, these people would be in jail for even attempting to do this kind of highway robbery.  Already,

we have seen video of a Public Storage customer in Lincolnwood, Illinois getting tasered by police for attempting to stop the auctioning off of his property.  Public Storage is playing with their customers’ lives – and their employees’ lives as well.  It is only a matter of time before some enraged Public Storage customer whose family heirlooms were auctioned off to the bottom-feeding scum from “Storage Wars” takes the law into his or her own hands and exacts revenge on the employees of the company.  When your corporate greed reaches such a level that your CEO gives the green light to the employees to start stealing people’s family photos and precious family mementos, you can be sure that sooner or later someone will be made to pay for such savagery.  Unfortunately, it probably won’t be the CEO of Public Storage who gets shuffled off this mortal coil ahead of schedule; it’ll be one of the minimum-wage debt slaves working at one of Public Storage’s facilities that will pay the price.  But of course the Public Storage corporate scumbags don’t give a rat’s ass about their employees any more than they do about their customers.

Our correspondent has been attempting to push his complaint up the chain of command at Public Storage; but as you can see, they just keep denying his appeal and sending it back to the lower court that has OK’d the auctioning off of all his property – the “local Property Manager”.  Our correspondent is not going to let these swine get away with their scheme, however.  He says he will keep us posted as the situation continues to develop.

This is just another reason why we say: PUBLIC STORAGE SUCKS!

Full text of Landmark Illinois Appellate Court Ruling: Hill v. PS Illinois Trust (2006)

[Source: http://www.state.il.us/court/opinions/appellatecourt/2006/1stdistrict/september/html/1054000.htm%5D

SECOND DIVISION

September 26, 2006

No. 1-05-4000


THEO HILL, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

PS ILLINOIS TRUST,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the
Circuit Court of
Cook County.
 

Honorable
Sophia Hall,
Judge Presiding.

 

PRESIDING JUSTICE WOLFSON delivered the opinion of the court:

The storage facility sold off plaintiff’s property because his rent payments were overdue. That sale gives rise to the plaintiff’s constitutional and statutory claims we address in this appeal.

Plaintiff Theo Hill filed a class action lawsuit against defendant PS Illinois Trust (PS), alleging the Illinois Self-Storage Facility Act (Storage Act) (770 ILCS 95/1 et. seq. (West 2004)) violated the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2). Plaintiff also alleged on his own behalf that PS’s actions in conducting a lien sale under the Storage Act were “unfair and deceptive” under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (CFA) (815 ILCS 505/2 (West 2004)).

PS moved to dismiss plaintiff’s case pursuant to section 2-615 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 2-615 (West 2004)). The trial court granted PS’s motion.

On appeal, plaintiff contends the trial court erred when it determined he failed to allege the requisite state action necessary to support a claim under the Illinois due process clause, and that he failed to state a claim under the CFA. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

FACTS

The pleadings reveal the facts relevant to this appeal. On August 5, 2003, defendant entered into a contract with PS for the rental of a storage locker in order to store his personal property. Plaintiff made his monthly payments for August and September. On October 17, 2003, plaintiff called PS’s storage facility to inform it that he would be late with October’s rent payment, but would make the payment later in the week. Plaintiff was told his account was past due, but was not told his property would be auctioned off if payment was not made.

Plaintiff was unable to make the October and November rental payments. On December 5, 2003, plaintiff called PS to check the balance on his account and arrange payment. Plaintiff was told his belongings were auctioned off on November 25, 2003. Plaintiff’s personal property was worth in excess of $25,000. According to plaintiff, he never received notice that PS would be auctioning off his property in order to enforce a lien created under section 3 of the Storage Act. 770 ILCS 95/3 (West 2004).

On January 26, 2005, plaintiff called PS to demand the return of any balance remaining from the lien sale, as required by section 4(j) of the Storage Act. 770 ILCS 95/4(j) (West 2004). A representative of PS told plaintiff “I have no idea what you are talking about.” On February 9, 2005, plaintiff faxed PS a letter demanding the return of any balance remaining. PS never responded to the letter.

Plaintiff filed a two-count complaint against PS in the circuit court of Cook County. In Count I, plaintiff sought, on behalf of himself and a putative class of PS customers, a declaratory judgment that the Storage Act was unconstitutional “on its face and as applied” because it failed to provide adequate notice. In Count II, plaintiff alleged on his own behalf that PS, in violation of the CFA, engaged in unfair and deceptive conduct when it sold his property.

PS moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code. PS contended: (1) plaintiff failed to allege the requisite state action necessary to support a claim under the due process clause of the Illinois State Constitution; and (2) plaintiff failed to allege any facts that would constitute an unfair act in violation of the CFA. The trial court dismissed Count I and gave plaintiff time to amend his claim under the CFA. Defendant then filed a motion to amend his complaint. The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion to amend and dismissed the case with prejudice. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of the CFA and declaratory judgment claims, but did not appeal from the trial court’s refusal to allow him to amend his complaint, nor did he appeal dismissal of his conversion claim.

DECISION

A section 2-615 motion to dismiss challenges only the legal sufficiency of the complaint. 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2004); Jarvis v. South Oak Dodge, Inc., 201 Ill. 2d 81, 85, 773 N.E.2d 641 (2002). The central inquiry is whether the allegations of the complaint, when considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to state a cause of action relief may be granted on. Jarvis, 201 Ill. 2d at 86; Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 174 Ill. 2d 482, 490, 675, N.E.2d 584 (1996). We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint under section 2-615 of the Code. Jarvis, 201 Ill. 2d at 86.

I. Due Process

Plaintiff contends the trial court erred when it determined he failed to allege the requisite state action necessary to support a claim under the Illinois due process clause.

Initially, we note plaintiff has not indicated he complied with Supreme Court Rule 19 (134 Ill. 2d R. 19), which requires a litigant challenging the constitutionality of a statute, ordinance, or administrative regulation to serve notice of the challenge upon the Attorney General or other affected agency or officer. While we recognize the failure of a litigant to strictly comply with the rule may result in forfeiture, our Supreme Court has concluded that “a party’s failure to comply with Rule 19 does not deprive the court of jurisdiction to consider the constitutional issue.” Village of Lake Villa v. Stokovich, 211 Ill. 2d 106, 119, 810 N.E.2d 13 (2004); Serafin v. Seith, 284 Ill. App. 3d 577, 672 N.E.2d 302 (1996) (“[m]oreover, even if the issue were not waived, we believe that [plaintiff’s] constitutional arguments are without merit.”) We will decide the issue, although its ripeness for consideration is dubious.

To assert a violation of the Illinois due process clause, a plaintiff must allege a state action deprived him of a protected right, privilege, or immunity. In re Adoption of L.T.M., 214 Ill. 2d 60, 73, 824 N.E.2d 221 (2005); USA I Lehndroff Vermoegensverwaltung GmbH & Cie v. Cousins Club, Inc., 64 Ill. 2d 11, 15-16, 348 N.E.2d 831 (1976). The Illinois due process clause stands “as a prohibition against governmental action, not action by private individuals.” Methodist Medical Center of Illinois v. Taylor, 104 Ill. App. 3d 713, 717, 489 N.E.2d 351 (1986).

Plaintiff contends state action was properly alleged in this case because the State of Illinois “authorized” PS, under section 4 of the Act, to violate his constitutional rights by selling his property without due process. See 770 ILCS 95/4 (West 2004). Plaintiff contends there are three distinct tests for determining whether there is state action. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614, 621-22, 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2083, 114 L.Ed.2d 660, 674 (1991). Plaintiff contends the third test, the “state authorization model,” applies in this case because the Storage Act specifically authorized PS to conduct the lien sale.

In response, PS contends plaintiff’s failure to attribute state action to PS’s decision to sell his goods is fatal to his due process claim. Defendant contends section 4 of the Act permitted, but did not compel, PS to sell plaintiff’s belongings. See 770 ILCS 95/3 (West 2004). PS contends merely permitting a private actor to make such a choice cannot support a finding of state action.

When appropriate, the Illinois Supreme Court has interpreted our state due process clause to provide greater protections than its federal counterpart. Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 186 Ill. 2d 198, 227, 710 N.E.2d 798 (1999) “Nonetheless, federal precedent interpreting the federal due process clause is useful as a guide in interpreting the Illinois provision.” Spagnolo, 186 Ill. 2d at 227.

To support his contention, plaintiff relies on three United States Supreme Court decisions: Edmonson, 500 U.S. 614, 111 S. Ct. 2077, 114 L.Ed.2d 2077; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948); and Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 87 S. Ct. 1627, 18 L.Ed.2d 830 (1967).

In Edmonson, the Court noted that “in determining whether a particular action or course of conduct is governmental in character, it is relevant to examine the following: the extent to which the actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits; whether the actor is performing a traditional governmental function; and whether the injury caused is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of governmental authority.” (Citations Omitted.) Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 621-22, 111 S. Ct. at 2083, 114 L.Ed.2d at 674. However, the Court also noted that “[a]lthough private use of state-sanctioned private remedies or procedures does not rise, by itself, to the level of state action, our cases have found state action when private parties make extensive use of state procedures with ‘overt, significant assistance of state officials.’ ” (Citations omitted.) Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 622, 111 S. Ct. at 2083, 114 L.Ed.2d at 674.

In Shelly, the Court concluded restrictive racial covenant agreements, standing alone, could not be regarded as a violation of any rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. “So long as the purposes of those agreements are effectuated by voluntary adherence to their terms, it would appear clear that there has been no action by the State.” Shelly, 334 U.S. at 13, 68 S. Ct. at 842, 92 L.Ed. at 1180. When the restrictive terms and purposes of the agreements were judicially enforced in state courts, however, sufficient state action was present to bring them under the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment. Shelly, 334 U.S. at 13-15, 68 S. Ct. at 842, 92 L.Ed. at 1180.

Finally, in Reitman, the U.S. Supreme Court held a California statute not only repealed an existing law forbidding private racial discriminations, but “was intended to authorize, and does authorize, racial discrimination in the housing market.” The California Supreme Court held the statute would significantly encourage and involve the State in private discrimination. After analyzing the decision, the Court found it had not been presented with any persuasive considerations indicating the California judgment should be overturned. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 381, 87 S. Ct. at 838, 18 L.Ed.2d at 1634.

By contrast, in Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 151, 98 S. Ct. 1729, 1731, 56 L.Ed.2d 185, 190 (1978), a case similar to the instant action, the Court considered whether a warehouseman’s proposed sale of goods entrusted to him for storage in order to collect overdue storage fees, as permitted by a New York statute, was an action properly attributable to the State of New York. Plaintiff initiated a class action in federal district court under section 1983 of the United States Code (42 U.S.C. § 1983), seeking damages, an injunction against the threatened sale of her belongings, and a declaration that such a sale pursuant to the New York statute would violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. In order to establish a section 1983 claim, plaintiff was required to show: (1) she was deprived of a right “secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States;” and (2) Flagg Brothers deprived her of this right acting “under color of any statute of the State of New York.” 436 U.S. at 155, 98 S. Ct. at 1733, 56 L.Ed.2d at 192.

The Court held the New York statute had done nothing more than “authorize (and indeed limit)–without participation by any public official–what Flagg Brothers would tend to do, even in the absence of such authorization, i.e., dispose of respondents’ property in order to free up its valuable storage space.” The proposed sale pursuant to the lien was not a significant departure from traditional private arrangements. Flagg Brothers, 436 U.S. at 163, 98 S. Ct. at 1737, 56 L.Ed.2d at 197. The “total absence of overt official involvement” distinguished the case from earlier decisions imposing procedural restrictions on creditors’ remedies. Flagg Brothers, 436 U.S. at 157, 98 S. Ct. at 1734, 56 L.Ed.2d at 194.

Notwithstanding, the plaintiffs contended Flagg Brothers’ proposed action under the statute was properly attributable to the State because “the State has authorized and encouraged it” by enacting the statute. Flagg Brothers, 436 U.S. at 164, 98 S. Ct. at 1737, 56 L.Ed.2d at 198. Rejecting the plaintiffs’ contention, the Court held its cases reflect that a State is responsible for the act of a private party only ” ‘when the State, by its law, has compelled the act.’ ” Flagg Brothers, 436 U.S. at 164, 98 S. Ct. at 1737, 56 L.Ed.2d at 198, quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 1615, 26 L.Ed.2d 142, 161-62 (1970). The Court noted it had “never held that a State’s mere acquiescence in a private action converts that action into that of the State.” Flagg Brothers, 436 U.S. at 164, 98 S. Ct. at 1737, 56 L.Ed.2d at 198. Flagg Brothers’ actions pursuant to the statute, without something more, were not sufficient to justify characterizing Flagg Brothers as a state actor. The Court did not directly or indirectly limit its decision to section 1983 cases.

Plaintiff contends Flagg Brothers is inapplicable here because the plaintiff in that case sought to hold individuals personally liable under section 1983 of the United States Code, rather than simply seeking to declare the New York statute unconstitutional. Plaintiff contends the issue of whether a defendant is a state actor is not relevant in an action seeking only to declare a state statute unconstitutional.

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, however, the United States Supreme Court has noted: “In cases under § 1983, ‘under color’ of law has consistently been treated as the same thing as the ‘state action’ required under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 928, 102 S. Ct 2744, 2749, 73 L.Ed.2d 482, 489 (1982), quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794, n. 7, 86 S. Ct. 1152, 1157, 16 L.Ed.2d 267, 272 (1966).

For example, in American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50, 119 S. Ct. 977, 985, 143 L.Ed.2d 130, 143 (1990), the plaintiffs, hoping to avoid the traditional application of the Court’s section 1983 state-action cases, characterized their claim as a “facial” or “direct” challenge to the procedures contained in the statute. The plaintiffs contended the Court need not concern itself with the “identity of the defendant” or the “act or decision by a private actor or entity who is relying on the challenged law.” Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 50, 119 S. Ct. at 985, 143 L.Ed.2d at 143. The Court held the argument ignored its repeated insistence that state action requires:

“both an alleged constitutional deprivation ’caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible,’ and that ‘the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 50, 119 S. Ct. at 985, 143 L.Ed.2d at 143, quoting Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937, 102 S. Ct. at 2753, 73 L.Ed.2d at 495.

The Court noted that in cases involving extensive state regulation of private activity, “we have consistently held that ‘[t]he mere fact that a business is subject to state regulation does not by itself convert its action into that of the State for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.’ ” Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 52, 119 S. Ct. at 986, 143 L.Ed.2d at 144-45, quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350, 95 S. Ct. 449, 453-54, 42 L.Ed.2d 477, 484 (1974). A private actor will not be held to constitutional standards unless ” ‘there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.’ ” Sullivan, 419 U.S. at 52, 119 S. Ct. at 986, 143 L.Ed.2d at 144-45, quoting Jackson, 419 U.S. at 350, 95 S. Ct. at 453-54, 42 L.Ed.2d at 484.

Whether such a “close nexus” exists depends on whether the State exercised coercive power or provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must be deemed to be that of the State. Sullivan, 419 U.S. at 52, 119 S. Ct. at 986, 143 L.Ed.2d at 144-45; Jackson, 419 U.S. at 350, 95 S. Ct. at 453-54, 42 L.Ed.2d at 484. “Action taken by private entities with the mere approval or acquiescence of the State is not state action.” Sullivan, 419 U.S. at 52, 119 S. Ct. at 986, 143 L.Ed.2d at 144-45.

The dividing line we seek to apply in this case was clearly drawn by the U.S. Supreme Court in Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 108 S. Ct. 1340, 99 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988). There, the question was whether a provision of Oklahoma’s probate laws requiring contract claims against an estate be presented within a specified time period violated the Due Process Clause.

The issue was whether state action wrongfully deprived a creditor of its property rights. Citing Flagg Brothers, the Court observed: “Private use of state-sanctioned private remedies or procedures does not rise to the level of state action.” Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc., 485 U.S. at 485, 108 S. Ct. at 1345, 99 L.Ed.2d at 575. “But,” the Court continued, “when private parties make use of state procedures with the overt, significant assistance of state officials, state action may be found.” Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc., 485 U.S. at 486, 108 S. Ct. at 1345, 99 L.Ed.2d at 576.

The Court found significant state action because the probate court was “intimately involved throughout, and without that involvement the time bar is never activated.” Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc., 485 U.S. at 487, 108 S. Ct. at 1346, 99 L.Ed.2d at 576. In the case before us, there was no significant state action by a court or by any other state official.

Similarly, the Illinois Supreme Court considered whether the Illinois distress for rent provisions (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 80, pars. 16-34) were unconstitutional in Cousins Club, Inc., 64 Ill. 2d 11. Under the distress for rent provisions, the actual distraint was accomplished by the acts of the lessor; no State action was involved in the procedure. The court noted:

“There are numerous holdings that when a creditor exercises his self-help remedy to repossess personal property as authorized under section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 26, par. 9-503) or under similar statutes, there is no State action involved so far as the question of due process is concerned.” Cousins Club, Inc., 64 Ill. 2d at 15.

The question was not simply whether state action was involved, but rather whether the role of the State was “sufficiently significant, constitutionally speaking, so that one may invoke the protection afforded by the due process clause.” Cousins Club, Inc., 64 Ill. 2d at 18. The court held the State was not “significantly involved, where, as here, the lessor takes possession of his tenant’s property pursuant to a statute that simply codifies the lessor’s common law right to do this and that does not have the State carry out the lessor’s rights.” Cousins Club, Inc., 64 Ill. 2d at 16.

In an attempt to circumvent the holdings in Flagg Brothers, Sullivan, and Cousins Club, Inc., plaintiff contends the United States Supreme Court “unequivocally” held in Lugar that: “While private misuse of a state statute does not describe conduct that can be attributed to the State, the procedural scheme created by the statute obviously is the product of state action.” (Emphasis Added.) Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941, 102 S. Ct. at 2756, 73 L.Ed.2d at 498. Plaintiff, however, ignores the Lugar Court’s determination that a state statute “is subject to constitutional restraint and properly may be addressed in a § 1983 action, if the second element of the state-action requirement is met as well.” (Emphasis added.) Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941, 102 S. Ct. at 2756, 73 L.Ed.2d at 498. The second element is whether, under the facts of the case, a private party may be appropriately characterized as a state actor. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939, 102 S. Ct. at 2754-55, 73 L.Ed.2d at 496-97.

In this case, there is no question plaintiff’s deprivation of property resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege having its source in state authority, i.e., the lien sale conducted pursuant to section 4 of the Storage Act. See 770 ILCS 95/4 (West 2004). Therefore, the question becomes whether PS may be appropriately characterized as a “state actor.” See Sullivan, 419 U.S. at 50, 119 S. Ct. at 985, 143 L.Ed.2d at 143; Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939, 102 S. Ct. at 2754-55, 73 L.Ed.2d at 496-97.

Similar to the statutes in Flagg Brothers and Sullivan, the Storage Act authorized, but did not require or compel, PS to sell plaintiff’s personal property stored at the facility in order to satisfy a lien for past due rent. Besides establishing the right to a lien and providing a self-help remedy by enacting the Storage Act, the State was not significantly involved in the seizure and sale of plaintiff’s property. See Cousins Club, Inc., 64 Ill. 2d at 16.

While we recognize the State’s decision to provide storage facility owners the option of conducting a lien sale can be seen as encouragement to do just that, “this kind of subtle encouragement is no more significant than that which inheres in the State’s creation or modification of any legal remedy.” See Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 53, 119 S. Ct. at 986, 143 L.Ed.2d at 146. Because the State did not compel, assist in, or significantly encourage the seizure and sale of plaintiff’s property, we find PS’s actions did not amount to “state action.” See Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 53, 119 S. Ct. at 986, 143 L.Ed.2d at 146; Flagg Brothers, 436 U.S. at 164, 98 S. Ct. at 1737, 56 L.Ed.2d at 198.

We therefore conclude the trial court did not err in dismissing Count I of plaintiff’s complaint.

II. Consumer Fraud

Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in dismissing Count II of his complaint because he adequately stated a cause of action under the unfair conduct prong of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act.

The CFA is “a regulatory and remedial statute intended to protect consumers, borrowers, and business people against fraud, unfair methods of competition, and other unfair and deceptive business practices.” Robinson v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 201 Ill. 2d 403, 419, 775 N.E.2d 951 (2002). A complaint raising a claim under the CFA “must state with particularity and specificity the deceptive manner of defendant’s acts or practices, and the failure to make such averments requires the dismissal of the complaint. Robinson, 201 Ill. 2d at 419; Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 174 Ill. 2d 482, 502, 675 N.E.2d 584 (1996).

Unfair or deceptive acts or practices are described in the CFA as:

“including but not limited to the use or employment of any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation or the concealment, suppression or omission of any material fact, with intent that others rely upon the concealment, suppression or omission of such material fact.” 815 ILCS 505/2 (West 2004).

A plaintiff may allege that conduct is unfair under the CFA without alleging that the conduct is deceptive. Saunders v. Michigan Avenue National Bank, 278 Ill. App. 3d 307, 313, 662 N.E.2d 602 (1996). In determining whether conduct is unfair, the CFA mandates consideration “be given to the interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts relating to Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.” 815 ILCS 505/2 (West 2004). In Federal Trade Comm’n v. Sperry, 405 U.S. 233, 244 n.5, 92 S. Ct. 898, 905, 31 L.Ed.2d 170, 178 (1972), the United States Supreme Court set out the requirements for establishing unfair conduct: (1) whether the practice offends public policy; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; and (3) whether it causes consumers substantial injury. See also Saunders, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 313 (“the defendant’s conduct must violate public policy, be so oppressive as to leave the consumer with little alternative but to submit, and injure the consumer.”)

In dismissing Count II of the complaint, the trial court found: “Plaintiff fails to allege that [PS] did not comply with the provisions of the Self Storage Facilities Act; therefore, Plaintiff fails to allege facts that constitute a violation of the act on any basis, let alone unfairness.”

Plaintiff’s complaint, however, alleged PS violated the CFA’s prohibition against unfair practices by failing to provide plaintiff with any form of statutorily-required notice that his property was being sold. Plaintiff specifically alleged that he “never received notice, either by telephone, in-person delivery or certified mail, that [PS] would be seeking to enforce the lien created in its favor,” as “required both by the Act itelf–see 770 ILCS 95/4(A)(C)–and by the express terms of the rental agreement Plaintiff signed.” Plaintiff also alleged PS engaged in unfair conduct by: failing to inform him of the outcome of the lien sale, or even acknowledge that it was statutorily required to return any surplus from such sale to plaintiff on demand; selling his personal property without allowing him the opportunity to exercise his statutory right to redeem the property; and failing to return to him any funds recouped from the sale of goods over and above the lien amount after defendant made a demand for the surplus.

Furthermore, plaintiff alleged PS’s conduct offended Illinois public policy, as embodied in the Storage Act; was unethical and oppressive because it was contrary to well-established industry practices and afforded him no reasonable opportunity to avoid the lien sale; and significantly harmed him because he lost nearly all of his possessions, including items of inestimable personal and sentimental value.

After reviewing the allegations contained in Count II of the complaint, taking them as true, we find they were sufficient to state a cause of action under the CFA for unfair conduct.

We therefore conclude the trial court erred in dismissing Count II of plaintiff’s complaint.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Count I of plaintiff’s complaint. We reverse the trial court’s dismissal of Count II of plaintiff’s complaint and remand for further proceedings.

Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part.

HOFFMAN, and SOUTH, JJ., concur.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Possible Legal Remedies for Illinois Citizens Facing Theft of Their Property by Storage Facilities

We’ve been doing some research on the legality of storage facilities utilizing lien law in Illinois to “legally” steal the property of citizens who fall behind on their rent payments.  The law as written is called  The Illinois “We’re Rich But We’re Gonna Steal Your Stuff Anyway” Act.

No, it SHOULD be called the Illinois “We’re Gonna Steal Your Stuff” Act, but it’s actually called “770 ILCS 95/ Self-Service Storage Facility Act”.

This act provides remedies for storage facilities whose customers are delinquent on their rent.  Apparently unhappy with the mere ability to steal their customers stuff practically at will, the storage companies and their wholly owned servants in the Illinois Legislature are working to buttress their “rights” under it as you read this.

[We found many websites that provide citizens with the text of all the laws that protect the “rights” of storage companies to steal your stuff.  That’s not surprising, because it appears that many of these websites were created by various storage companies in order to make it LOOK like their customers have no legal way to fight these anti-renter laws.  But that’s just what big money always does: tries to pull the wool over our eyes and make us – all 300 million of us – feel small and insignificant in comparison to the relative handful of them.]

The Illinois Self-service Storage Facility Act does not REQUIRE the companies to take brutal action by asserting their rights to place liens on their customers’ property every chance they get; whether or not the storage companies choose to enforce the rights they were granted under this act is completely up to them.  They can decide to allow you to make payments if they want; they can give you as much time to catch up with the payments as you need.  But they’re not trying to be fair – THEY WANT TO STEAL YOUR STUFF!

If all the citizens of Illinois had to defend their property rights were crappy laws like this one, we’d all be having our stuff stolen by every scumbag in the state.  But happily, that is not the case.

The Illinois Constitution, following the language of the US Constitution and Bill of Rights, provides the following sweeping protection from wanton, illegal property seizures:

“SECTION 2. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law nor be denied the equal protection of the laws.”

However, many court decisions at the state and US Supreme Court level have ruled that private individuals can’t be charged with the denial of due process simply because they are utilizing existing state and local laws governing their actions to screw their customers over because the storage companies are not “state actors”.  You don’t have to be a lawyer to understand this baloney, but you need to be brainwashed through 8 years of law school to come to the conclusion that laws like this that allow rich people to steal the property of poor people somehow make for a civilized society.

In 2006, a landmark Illinois Court of Appeals ruling gave a nice, concise (though seemingly very poor in terms of its legal argument) rundown of the existing state of the law pertaining to storage facilities and their “rights” under lien laws in HILL vs. PS ILLINOIS TRUST.

We recommend reading this interesting decision.  Seems that one Theo Hill had his stuff stolen – legally – by PS Illinois Trust and he sought legal remedies in good old C(r)ook County!  And guess what?  The crooked-ass C(r)ook County Court ruled against him in the case.  Crook County – the crookedest county in the crookedest state in the United States – always defends the rich and brutalizes the poor.  The whole world knows how crooked C(r)ook County is!  So Mr. Hill and his law team appealed the case to the Illinois Appellate Court – where part of his argument was shot down for arcane and poorly reasoned reasons – but another part was upheld!  And that’s where we all have a chance to kick some of these storage companies’ asses!

 

You see, even though the self-storage companies have managed to bribe enough crooked Illinois senators and representatives to get the “We’re Rich but We’re Gonna Steal Your Stuff Anyway” Act passed, there is another set of laws that provides the citizens of Illinois with a very thin but useful layer of protection from the thieves at the storage companies:

The Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act

Under this set of laws, the citizens of Illinois have some legal remedies for “deceptive business practices” as well as “immoral” practices.  And this is where the rubber can hit the road for those of us who need to deal with a lien action coming from a self-storage facility.

Theo Hill, in his appeal of his case,  asserted that the crooked C(r)ook County Court “erred in dismissing Count II of his complaint because he adequately stated a cause of action under the unfair conduct prong of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act.” 

And the Appellate Court agreed with him!  We quote at length from the final paragraphs of Hill vs. PS Illinois Trust:

In dismissing Count II of the complaint, the trial court found: ‘Plaintiff fails to allege that [PS] did not comply with the provisions of the Self Storage Facilities Act; therefore, Plaintiff fails to allege facts that constitute a violation of the act on any basis, let alone unfairness.’

“Plaintiff’s complaint, however, alleged PS violated the CFA’s prohibition against unfair practices by failing to provide plaintiff with any form of statutorily-required notice that his property was being sold. Plaintiff specifically alleged that he ‘never received notice, either by telephone, in-person delivery or certified mail, that [PS] would be seeking to enforce the lien created in its favor,’ as ‘required both by the Act itself–see 770 ILCS 95/4(A)(C)–and by the express terms of the rental agreement Plaintiff signed.’ Plaintiff also alleged PS engaged in unfair conduct by: failing to inform him of the outcome of the lien sale, or even acknowledge that it was statutorily required to return any surplus from such sale to plaintiff on demand; selling his personal property without allowing him the opportunity to exercise his statutory right to redeem the property; and failing to return to him any funds recouped from the sale of goods over and above the lien amount after defendant made a demand for the surplus.

“Furthermore, plaintiff alleged PS’s conduct offended Illinois public policy, as embodied in the Storage Act; was unethical and oppressive because it was contrary to well-established industry practices and afforded him no reasonable opportunity to avoid the lien sale; and significantly harmed him because he lost nearly all of his possessions, including items of inestimable personal and sentimental value.

“After reviewing the allegations contained in Count II of the complaint, taking them as true, we find they were sufficient to state a cause of action under the CFA for unfair conduct.

“We therefore conclude the trial court erred in dismissing Count II of plaintiff’s complaint.

CONCLUSION

“We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Count I of plaintiff’s complaint. We reverse the trial court’s dismissal of Count II of plaintiff’s complaint and remand for further proceedings.”

Hill’s “half-a-loaf” therefore becomes, for us, a meal.  We need to do some more research on this case to see how his case was finally adjudicated and to determine what remedies he sought for relief from PS Storage Trust under the Illinois Consumer protection laws.

We just discovered this information ourselves, so we need some time to read it over and see what we need to do in order to wage a successful legal battle against the storage companies who want to STEAL YOUR STUFF!  Look for another article on this subject in the near future.  Meanwhile, we’d like to thank Mr. Theo Hill for having the guts to stand up for his rights and for the rights of every citizen of the state of Illinois by taking legal action on behalf of us all in battling PS Storage Trust.  If we had more citizens like Mr. Hill, this would be a much better country for working people to live in than it is.

Oh yeah, one other thing we almost forgot to mention: PUBLIC STORAGE SUCKS!